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From: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: U.S. NAVY FLEET SAFETY CAMPAIGN PLAN

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5210.20

Encl: (1) U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Campaign Plan

1. Purpose. To establish the U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Campaign Plan and implement a U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Management System (SMS).

2. Scope. This instruction applies to all commands and personnel in the Operating Forces of the U.S. Navy Fleet.

3. Discussion

a. Enclosure (1) provides an overarching plan to move our command culture closer to being more proactive and predictive within the realm of operational and occupational safety. There are two elements within our Navy Safety organization: The Safety and Occupational Health element and the Operational Safety element. This campaign will impact both and requires your attention.

b. The enemy of Safety is the mishap or safety-related incident. Our own human error is the enemy center of gravity. The enemy operates within our lifelines daily. Eighty percent of mishaps are due to our own mistakes. We need to improve our practices. As leaders, we should foster communication that allows us to be apprised of our safety risks and to proactively mitigate them.

c. Leaders should be cautious of their safety communications to avoid portraying a "zero defect" mentality. It is expected that our operators at the controls, standing the

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
watch, and conducting everyday business are provided with the tools and training that will allow them to remove as much risk as possible. While we cannot expect to be perfect, we do expect that there are significant gains to be found in the systematic mapping of our current safety culture, organization, procedures, and policy. This task will be led by the Naval Safety Center as they map our current SMS, determine the gaps and overlaps in our system, then design the future world class SMS that our Navy deserves.


d. The Safety Campaign Plan calls upon the Type Commanders to participate in a collaborative environment to present their best practices and be open to accepting and adopting best practices from other warfighting communities. We must strive to operate to the left of the mishap event and simultaneously develop procedures that mitigate the severity of the mishap event in the moments following its occurrence.

e. As leaders of our Navy, we have many challenges to resolve what will remain far beyond our own personal involvement. One such challenge is our ability to continue to operate in combat and conduct training in a means that fosters preservation of our forces and equipment, both on and off duty. Our command culture must reflect our desire to drive down our mishaps and safety-related incidents. Your active leadership in safety matters will continue to make a difference in our collective readiness.

4. Action. All levels of command shall implement and manage the provisions of this instruction, as applicable.

5. Records Management. Records created as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, will be managed per reference (a).


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U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Campaign Plan



25 June 2014

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1. Situation

a. **General.** Mishaps and safety-related incidents continue to cost the U.S. Navy and the Nation significantly in terms of loss of personnel, damaged or destroyed equipment, and reduced combat readiness. The U.S. Navy's overall mishap cost for Fleet materiel and Fleet personnel injuries in Fiscal Years 2011 through 2014^a was greater than \$1 billion with 116 fatalities. *Roughly 80 percent of all mishaps were human-factor related.* Department of the Navy (DON) Objectives for Fiscal Year 2013 communicated DON priorities, including the need to take care of our people and prevent personnel and materiel mishaps as a means to maximize warfighter readiness and avoid reducing our future fleet readiness. Current focus of the operational forces safety program is reactive and mainly focused on Class A mishaps. Relatively less focus is given to investigating and addressing Class B, C, and D mishaps; hazards and causal factors of near misses; and other precursors of higher severity mishaps. Reducing mishaps will require a culture change with regard to how safety is viewed across the warfighting communities. However, there can be no doubt that this is a necessary endeavor. *Safety is good warfighting and inseparable from readiness.*

(1) Environment of Conflict

(a) The U.S. Navy's Fleet (hereinafter referred to simply as the "U.S. Fleet") has different and distinct operational cultures, each having been shaped by the organizational structure, unique needs, and priorities of the different warfighting communities. Safety policies, manning, and procedures have evolved over decades within stovepipes defined by the various warfighting communities. This disjointed approach has led to wide disparities in the way safety is viewed and managed across the operating forces. The ongoing differences between safety program policies, safety organization and manning (i.e., at all echelons), safety training, and safety reporting capability, all contribute to the attitudes, incentives, and overall safety culture of the warfighting communities. In some cases, these differences make sense and enhance the effectiveness and readiness of the communities as they perform their missions. However, in some cases the unique approach to management of safety programs breeds complacency within the community and becomes a barrier to predicting and addressing safety issues before they happen.

(b) Safety program focus, the level of safety awareness, and the level of effort expended in investigating and reporting mishaps are directed at addressing the high-cost Class A mishaps. Less focus and investigative level of effort is directed at identifying and mitigating hazards that are associated with near misses and Class B, C, and D mishaps. This reactive focus is a barrier to the development of a proactive and predictive safety culture across all warfighting communities.

(c) The operational environment of our Navy team is global and involves both uniformed and civilian participants, both at work and off duty. *Mishaps and safety-related incidents are our enemy.* The enemy does not rest, and, has no borders. In most cases, the enemy is

^aAs of February 2014.

embedded in our own actions and reveals itself due to human error. The environment where the enemy exists is inside our lifelines.

(2) Policy Goals

(a) U.S. Fleet Policy Goal. Implementation of a safety cultural change by means of a formal Safety Management System (SMS) within each operating force subordinate to U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) and U.S. Pacific Fleet Command (CPF) provides a framework to continuously improve safety performance and attack the enemies of safety wherever they exists. It should be noted that Military Sealift Command already has an SMS in place.

(b) End State. The U.S. Fleet achieves a world class safety culture that operates a comprehensive and operationalized SMS that eliminates preventable mishaps and safety-related incidents by reducing human error in order to preserve our warfighting capabilities. Safety is *operationalized* at all levels, across all stakeholders. A fully operationalized safety system will use Operational Risk Management (ORM) as a decision tool, safe practices will be woven into every liberty period, training, and operational event conducted ashore and afloat, and every leader has a means of assessing the safety practices under their purview.

(3) Operational Limitations

(a) The SMS must be scalable and implementable across the U.S. Fleet.

(b) Courses of Action (COAs) must contain estimated costs (e.g., fiscal, manpower) to implement and sustain.

(c) The SMS shall contain tools for the operator to use (e.g., technology, procedures).

(d) The U.S. Fleet shall have a safety assessment mechanism that is metrics-based and measurable.

(e) The SMS shall incorporate layered communications to provide timely transparency.

(f) The SMS must not detract from our current safety successes.

b. Area of Concern

(1) Adversary Center of Gravity - The adversary for this campaign is “a mishap or safety-related incident.” The adversary’s Center of Gravity is *human error*. The preponderance of power of our enemy is found in our own human error.

(2) Friendly Naval Forces - All of the operating forces of the U.S. Navy.

(3) Friendly Critical Vulnerability - Unidentified hazards and unmitigated/poorly mitigated risk.

(4) Friendly Center of Gravity - The *human instinct to survive*.

c. Assumptions

(1) Mishaps and safety-related incidents degrade operational readiness.

(2) Risk is inherent in naval operations and can be mitigated to an acceptable level.

(3) Achieving a greater degree of safety standardization and increased sharing of best practices and lessons learned across the U.S. Fleet operational warfighting communities, when warranted, will facilitate the reduction of mishaps and safety-related incidents.

(4) An SMS will improve the U.S. Fleet's safety culture.

2. Mission

a. On order, the U.S. Fleet will implement an SMS throughout the chain of command in order to create a *proactive and predictive* risk-management culture.

3. Execution

a. **Concept of Operations.** A formal U.S. Fleet Concept of Operation (CONOP) for the implementation of a comprehensive SMS framework will be developed by NAVSAFECEN and representatives from the U.S. Fleet. The SMS will have the four components of Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance and Safety Promotions supported by the Safety Campaign Plan Lines of Effort (LOE). To the greatest extent possible, operating force safety policies, programs, processes, organization, and training will be aligned and/or standardized; therefore, it is critical that key stakeholders with the respective warfighting communities participate in the development of the SMS framework. The DoD defines a "system" as a "functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole."¹ An SMS is not a single software system or database, but a "system of systems," or collection of processes with layers of management practices and policies that collectively improve U.S. Fleet safety programs and operational execution of our missions on and off duty. The SMS framework will be flexible enough to allow individual Force Commanders to tailor the SMS to account for Force-specific missions and operating environments. Air, submarine, surface, and expeditionary Force Commanders will implement the SMS framework elements into existing U.S. Fleet and Force policies, programs, and processes that support the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (O-FRP); including, but not limited to, operation and exercise planning, warfighting operations, maintenance, logistics, manpower, and training. The means to implement the SMS framework will be the Safety Campaign Plan's eight DOTMLPF-P LOEs illustrated in Figure 3-1.

¹Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

Line of Effort	Description
<u>D</u> octrine	The way we fight
<u>O</u> rganization	How we organize to fight
<u>T</u> raining	How we prepare to fight tactically
<u>M</u> ateriel	All the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces
<u>L</u> eadership and Education	How we prepare our leaders to lead the fight from seaman recruit to 4-star admiral
<u>P</u> ersonnel	Availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations
<u>F</u> acilities	Real property; installations and industrial facilities (e.g. government owned ammunition production facilities) that support our forces
<u>P</u> olicy	DoD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other seven non-materiel elements

Figure 3-1. The Eight DOTMLPF-P Lines of Effort

(1) **Commander’s Intent.** While human error is a significant contributor to safety-related incidents and mishaps, we cannot anticipate that we will be able to train the perfect operator. The operating environment is complex and dynamic, and humans make errors. However, strong, clear policies and processes, a robust and effective safety culture, and well-trained sailors, will reduce human error and positively impact Fleet readiness. For these reasons, the Fleet will work to align safety cultures across warfighting communities in order to reduce personnel injuries/losses and materiel damages/losses and the resulting negative effects on combat readiness. The U.S. Fleet will attack the *enemy* center of gravity through the eight DOTMLPF-P LOEs illustrated in Figure 3-1. The U.S. Fleet will use the same LOEs to simultaneously protect the *friendly* center of gravity.

(2) General

(a) Objectives

- Operationalize a flexible SMS.
- A proactive and predictive safety culture exists Fleet-wide.
- USFF/CPF safety policies are implemented.
- Safety investigations, inspections, and reporting are completed.
- Risk management practices are standardized.
- Organizational structure and manning is optimized to support the safety campaign.
- Fleet operators have the safety “tools,” training, and procedures to conduct their missions.
- Proactive and predictive tracking and trending analysis supports safe Fleet operations.
- Fleet assets are operated by governing policies.
- Fleet safety systems and equipment improvements/deficiencies are addressed by respective claimants.
- Safety training is operationalized.

(b) **Phasing of Operations.** The following three phases are a roadmap meant to guide commands through their transition to full SMS functionality and a sustained safety culture. Implementation and assessment will be ongoing and exist through all three phases.

1. Phase 1: Situational awareness

- Gain situational awareness with regard to current safety systems, policies, and practices.
- Determine gaps and shortfalls in U.S. Fleet safety operations.

2. Phase 2: Planning. Stakeholders shall:

- Meet collaboratively to develop a system of systems that will become the SMS.
- Reconcile safety gaps and shortfalls concurrently with SMS development.
- Stakeholders shall not delay in developing solutions to emergent or critical safety concerns while the campaign planning is ongoing.

3. Phase 3: Execution. This phase will continue until superseded by order. Execute a sustainable SMS. As elements of the campaign mature they will be added to the SMS. Analysis via mature metrics will guide us in our continued efforts to target the enemy of safety (i.e., *human error*).

b. Tasks

(1) USFF and CPF will establish a Safety Campaign Executive Steering group consisting of USFF Safety Officer, CPF Safety Officer, and NAVSAFECEN representatives.

(2) USFF and CPF will establish an SMS Planning Team consisting of Force and Type Command representatives with the goal of providing a forum for sharing implementation plans and best practices among communities.

(3) Director, USFF Maritime Headquarters is designated as the Echelon II Lead for execution of the U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Campaign Plan.

(4) NAVSAFECEN, in coordination with USFF and CPF, determine a strategy for incorporating the SMS purpose, duties, and responsibilities into policy. Conduct analysis of internal functions, policies, and processes. Determine gaps across all LOEs as they pertain to the SMS components and the differences between warfare communities. Identify gaps in ORM training within existing curricula and instructions throughout the Navy enterprise.

(5) All commands subordinate to USFF and CPF shall be prepared to:

- Support the rapid accomplishment of Phases I and II.
- Provide subject matter experts, as required, to Safety Planning Teams.

(6) All commands subordinate to USFF and CPF shall, on order:

- Identify disincentives and cultural barriers to free and open communication of safety information throughout the operating forces and develop incentive programs to eliminate identified barriers.
- Conduct analysis of Force and Type Command organization, responsibilities, functions, policies, and processes that support safety processes and functions.
- Determine gaps across all LOEs as they pertain to the SMS components and the difference between warfare communities.
- Identify areas where unmitigated risk is being transferred to operational-level commands.
- Conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of existing community-specific and platform-specific groups and processes that facilitate identification, prioritization, and communication of safety-related training, manpower, platform/system materiel, and logistics concerns to the Fleet Commander, OPNAV, and supporting commands (e.g. SYSCOM, PERSCOM, etc.).
- Identify gaps in resource requirements relative to overarching SMS implementation across operating Forces in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process.
- Share identified gaps with other Type Commanders and identify common elements that can be applied to the SMS framework.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Sustainment of the SMS will require a communications plan and other support from the USFF/CPF internal staff. USFF/CPF and TYCOM personnel, and their respective safety personnel and public affairs directorates, are expected to support the SMS development and execution through participation in planning teams.

5. Command and Control Relationships

a. USFF, CPF, and NAVSAFECEN will coordinate SMS implementation with subordinate commanders of U.S. Fleet operating forces through the provision of direct liaison authority.²

b. Conflict with higher level policies and/or regulations. If anything in the safety campaign, or the overarching SMS framework is, or later becomes, inconsistent with higher-level DoD, Navy, or other applicable directives or regulations, the senior-level directive or regulation shall be followed. Subordinate commands shall notify USFF, CPF, and NAVSAFECEN of any conflicts.

c. USFF, CPF, and NAVSAFECEN are the lead agents for executing the Safety Campaign; however, other supporting enterprises, agencies, and commands across the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps are encouraged to join in the implementation of this effort.

²Memorandum of Agreement Regarding Supported-Supporting Relationships of U.S Pacific Fleet, U.S. Fleet Forces and Naval Safety Center dated 8 May 2013.